Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
满洲里边境经济合作管理条例
内蒙古自治区人大常委会
满洲里边境经济合作管理条例
内蒙古自治区人民代表大会常务委员会
内蒙古自治区人民代表大会常务委员会公告第五十九号
（2001年8月1日内蒙古自治区第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十四次会议通过，自2001年9月1日起实施）
第一条 为了加快满洲里边境经济合作区开发建设，扩大对外经济贸易、经济技术合作和交流，促进满洲里口岸经济发展，根据国家有关法律、法规，结合合作区实际，制定本条例。
第二条 本条例所称满洲里边境经济合作区（以下简称合作区），是指经国务院批准设立的，享受国家和自治区优惠政策，实行对外开放，发展口岸经济的特定区域。
第三条 本条例适用于合作区的开发、建设和管理。
第四条 合作区应当利用口岸优势，吸引国内外投资，引进先进技术、设备和科学的管理经验，开展进出口加工贸易、经济技术合作和兴办相应第三产业。
第五条 合作区应当加强基础设施和公共设施建设，为国内外投资者提供良好的投资环境和工作、生活条件。
第六条 满洲里市人民政府在合作区设立边境经济合作区管理委员会（以下简称合作区管委会），行使本条例规定的各项职权，对合作区内的经济、社会事务实行统一领导和管理。
自治区人民政府、满洲里市人民政府要根据国家有关规定，赋予合作区管委会相应的管理权限；各有关部门要在职责范围内，配合合作区管委会工作，支持合作区管委会依法行使职权。
第七条 合作区管委会行使下列职权：
（一）按照满洲里市的国民经济和社会发展计划，编制合作区的国民经济和社会发展计划，经批准后组织实施；
（二）统筹安排合作区的投资项目，按规定审批或者审核在合作区内的投资项目；
（三）依法负责合作区内土地的规划、审批、征用、开发、管理的有关工作；
（四）负责合作区城市规划、建设、管理和环境保护工作；
（五）建立一级财政、一级预算、一级金库，负责合作区财政预算、国有资产、审计、计划、经贸、统计、劳动人事管理工作；
（六）兴办和管理合作区内的科技、文化、教育、卫生、体育等各项公共事业；
（七）协助处理合作区内的涉外事务，依法管理合作区进出口业务；
（八）自治区人民政府、满洲里市人民政府赋予的其他职权。
第八条 工商、税务、质量技术监督、公安等部门应当在合作区设立分支机构或者派出机构，同时在合作区管委会领导下开展工作。
金融、保险、外汇管理、海关、出入境检验检疫等部门可以在合作区内设立分支机构或者派出机构，办理相关事务。
第九条 合作区内国有土地使用权依照国家有关法律、法规的规定可以出让、转让、出租、抵押。
第十条 在合作区投资经营可以采取下列方式：
（一）中外合资经营、中外合作经营、外资经营；
（二）国内企业和其他经济组织或者个人采取独资、合伙、股份制、股份合作制经营；
（三）来料加工、来样加工、来件装配和补偿贸易；
（四）租赁经营、委托经营；
（五）法律、法规允许的其他方式。
第十一条 合作区鼓励兴办下列产业或者项目：
（一）出口加工和进口原材料加工项目；
（二）高新技术产业；
（三）产品替代进口项目；
（四）能源、交通、基础设施项目；
（五）边境贸易、劳务输出、经济技术合作项目；
（六）第三产业；
（七）开发地方资源项目。
第十二条 合作区内禁止兴办技术落后、排放污染物超过法定标准和不符合国家产业政策的项目；避免重复建设。
第十三条 合作区内的企业，享受国家和自治区人民政府给予满洲里市和合作区的一切优惠政策。
合作区管委会根据国家和自治区的有关规定，可以制定相关优惠政策。
第十四条 合作区管委会和有关部门、机构应当强化服务功能，建立公开办事制度，简化工作程序，提高办事效率，为投资者提供便捷、高效、优质的服务。
中外投资者在合作区内投资兴办企业及各项事业，合作区管委会和有关部门、机构应当在规定的期限内办理相关手续。
第十五条 经批准兴建的建设项目，不能按期兴建，又未经批准延期的，依法收回土地使用权，注销土地使用证书。
第十六条 合作区内的企业应当依法向有关部门报送会计报表、统计资料，接受财政、统计、税务和审计部门的监督。
第十七条 合作区内的企业应当遵守劳动和社会保障的法律、法规，依法建立工会组织，维护职工合法权益。
合作区内的企业录用职工应当通过职业介绍机构，依法签订劳动合同，办理社会保险等相关手续，并向合作区管委会备案。
第十八条 合作区内的企业变更、合并、分立、迁移、歇业以及终止，经原审批机关同意后，依法办理有关手续。
第十九条 合作区管委会和有关部门、机构的工作人员玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊的，其所在单位或者上级主管部门给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第二十条 本条例自2001年9月1日起施行。
2001年8月1日
